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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a reflection on evolutionary technological change and economic growth 
theory, which starts from the Lakatosian methodology of scientific research programmes 
(MSRP) as an appraisal criterion. As the persistence of some inflexibility on the approach made 
difficult to capture fundamental features of that scientific endeavour, it was undertaken an 
analysis using an alternative framework developed by Hoover (1991). This last frame is used 
not as a formal methodology but as a language to find patterns in these theories. This exercise 
evolved then towards some considerations about the confrontation of these evolutionary theories 
with what can be seen (in a loose sense) as their ‘rival research programme’, the new 
neoclassical growth models. 
 




O presente artigo propõe uma reflexão sobre a teoria evolucionista do crescimento económico e 
progresso tecnológico, que parte da metodologia científica de research programmes de Lakatos 
como critério de avaliação. Como a presença de alguma rigidez nesta abordagem tornou difícil 
captar características fundamentais daquela linha teórica, foi desenvolvida uma análise baseada 
num quadro de trabalho alternativo proposto por Hoover (1991). Este último é usado não como 
uma metodologia formal mas como uma linguagem para encontrar padrões nestas teorias. Este 
exercício evoluiu depois para algumas considerações sobre o confronto destas teorias 
evolucionistas com o que pode ser entendido (num sentido livre) como o research programme 
rival, os novos modelos de crescimento neoclássicos. 
 
Palavras-chave:  Evolucionismo, crescimento económico, progresso tecnológico, Lakatos, 
Kuhn, research programme. 
                                                 
* This paper was produced within the course on History of Economic Thought that composes the doctoral 
programme on economics offered by the Faculty of Economics of Porto. I am grateful to Professor Roger 
Backhouse who helped to improve enormously this work.   
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1. Introduction 
My first incursions into the field of economic growth provided the contact with the 
Solow’s model (1957) and a set of models generally considered as the archetypes of 
endogenous growth theory (Romer 1986 and 1990; Lucas 1988; Aghion and Howitt 
1992). For some time I was clearly inside mainstream when thinking about economic 
growth and mainstream is neoclassical growth modelling. However, at some point I was 
confronted with an alternative theorizing, the evolutionary economics, which conducted 
to an investigation of the state of the art of a distinct and rather puzzling framework for 
theoretical and empirical research within economics. Evolutionary economics has a 
large range of research areas such as economic growth, industrial organisation, game 
theory, learning dynamics and bounded rationality, organisation theory, financial 
markets and the interactions between economics, law and culture (Silverberg and 
Verspagen 1997a). Faced with this wide theoretical frame, I was forced to look for a 
more clear definition of evolutionary theorizing on technological advance and economic 
growth.  
Beyond a review of literature on this topic I think it is important to analyse it using an 
appraisal criterion. Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP) 
seems a helpful starting point, despite the strong criticisms pointed to the Lakatosian 
framework
1, to deal with a significant set of questions about the nature and growth of 
economic knowledge (Backhouse 1998). Based on this conviction, the need for getting 
a more unambiguous picture of what is evolutionary technological advance and 
economic growth theorizing conducted me to an analysis of the subject using Lakatos’s 
view of the history and methodology of science, exploring the development of this 
school within Lakatos’s framework and investigating if it constitutes a scientific 
research programme. 
However, after using Lakatos as a starting point, I depart from there as the Lakatosian 
approach does not seem to confine some fundamental features of the scientific 
endeavour in study. I follow Hoover (1991) who, at a certain extent inspired by Kuhn, 
provides an alternative framework to attempt a description of scientific process. Hoover 
used this approach to analyse the new classical macroeconomics. I develop an effort to 
                                                 
1 This approach dominated the debate on economic methodology until the late 1980s (Backhouse 1998). 
However, by the end of the decade, the MSRP was already out of fashion, reflecting strong criticisms 
regarding this methodology. For a detailed analysis on Lakatos see Backhouse, 1998.   
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apply the same approach to my case having in mind its use as a language or a way of 
thinking to find some patterns in evolutionary theories, and not as a formal 
methodology. At last, some considerations are made regarding what can be seen as the 
‘rival research programme’ (in a loose sense) of that theorizing: the new neoclassical 
growth models. 
2. AN EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMIC GROWTH RESEARCH PROGRAMME 
An analysis of evolutionary growth economics based on the MSRP means the coming 
out of several questions about this field. It is possible to ask if it constitutes a distinct 
programme; if so, find out what is the programme and how it has been developing. As 
Hoover (1991) stresses when talking about the new classical macroeconomics, the 
answer to those questions within Lakatos’s spirit requires offering a ‘programmatic 
interpretation’ (Hoover 1991: 365). To construct this programmatic analysis I will start 
with an attempt to define the hard core and the heuristics of evolutionary growth 
economics, assuming it can be interpreted as a research programme. For that purpose I 
will recall some literature on this field that I consider crucial to support such an attempt. 
Nelson and Winter’s An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982) is 
categorized as the benchmark in evolutionary economics. They propose an evolutionary 
theory of the capabilities and behaviour of business firms operating in a certain market 
environment, sturdily indicating the return of biological analogies to economics. In this 
theoretical frame there is a selection process operating on firms’ internal routines and 
the routines are appreciated as the suitable and effective behaviours in a certain setting. 
They are the product of processes characterised by profit-oriented, learning and 
selection. The routines that a firm uses at any time can be seen as ‘the best it knows and 
can do’. The rationality in this employment rests in that sense, even if the firm did not 
make any effort to balance its existent routines with all possible alternative ones 
(Nelson 1995: 69). Nelson and Winter see the routines as repositories of knowledge and 
skills with the ability to replicate, for example by imitation and personal mobility. The 
concept of routine is vital to understand economic evolutionary thought. 
Another concept that emerges from evolutionary economics is search which Nelson and 
Winter identify as ‘the counterpart of that of mutation in biological evolutionary theory’ 
(Nelson and Winter 1982: 18). Their model of economic growth demonstrates this 
concept. Search is conceived as Research and Development (R&D) actions developed   
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by firms. If firms are profitable enough they only try to keep their routines and so they 
do not enter into search. If a chosen level of profitability is not observed firms invest in 
R&D and take on actions to discover new techniques having as purpose to restore their 
profitability
2. One more biological analogy present in evolutionary economics consists 
in the idea of natural selection and market competition (Hodgson 1999). 
Although the presence of biological analogies, Nelson and Winter’s theory is 
categorized as “unabashedly Lamarckian: it contemplates both the ‘inheritance’ of 
acquired characteristics and the timely appearance of variation under the stimulus of 
adversity” (Nelson and Winter 1982: 11)
3. 
The explanation of the economic system comprises random and mechanic elements. The 
first ones generate some variation among the variables in analysis and the second ones 
win systematically on the existing variation (Silverberg and Verspagen 1997a). So, on 
the evolutionary framework, as Andersen (1994) stresses, it is assumed that the 
economic system is characterized by changing diversity and evolving processes of 
adaptive behaviour, where novelty has a fundamental role. This emphasis on dynamics 
and bounded rationality clearly is not compatible with the traditional neoclassical 
concepts of equilibrium and optimisation. 
While the evolutionary thinking is constructed on an open-system approach where not 
all relevant variables and relationships are knowable, consenting for a range of possible 
combinations of methods, the neoclassical framework is typically characterised by a 
closed-system approach where all variables and relationships between them are 
predictable, allowing for representation in a formal mathematical model (Dow 2000). 
The literature on evolutionary technological change and economic growth is wide and I 
could continue to outline it. However, after highlighting some topics on the subject 
regarded as important to understand the following exercise, I point to Dosi et al. (1988) 
and their systematisation effort, which suggests a set of archetypal characteristics of 
evolutionary economic thought that have been used as a reference in most modelling 
efforts developed on the field. This methodical sum up provides a set of assumptions 
                                                 
2 Nelson and Winter used Herbert Simon’s concept of ‘satisfacing behaviour’. Therefore, agents do not 
optimise; they try to achieve an ‘aspiration level’. 
3 To sustain this classification the authors stress the inexact correspondence between routine and gene. 
Routines are relatively robust in socio-economic terms but not so durable as the gene in biology. Also, the 
new features associated to the change of routines can be imitated and inherited by imitators or subsidiary 
firms (Nelson and Winter 1982).   
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commonly accepted as indisputable by researchers working within this theoretical 
framework. Also, Silverberg and Verspagen (1997b) offer a survey of evolutionary 
economic growth that confirms the somewhat “hard” nature of such assumptions. 
All these citations appear as a strong support to construct the hard core of the (assumed) 
programme. It follows a list of the propositions: 
-  Economic agents are heterogeneous; 
-  Agents are never perfectly informed and they have to optimise (at best) locally 
rather than globally; 
-  Decision-making processes are generally bounded by rules, norms and institutions; 
-  Agents may imitate the routines of other agents, being able to learn and to create 
novelty (mutation or search); 
-  The processes behind innovation and imitation are characterised by cumulativeness 
and path dependency
4, although they can be broken by sporadic discontinuities; 
-  Agents interact in disequilibria contexts. 
The same citations are very helpful for the selection of the rules that may constitute the 
negative and positive heuristics of the programme. As the negative heuristic it seems 
reasonable to adopt Hoover’s (1991) point of view as electing a summed up rule in the 
injunction ‘do not violate any hard core propositions’, containing propositions such as: 
-  Do not construct theories in which the economic system is static and automatically 
in equilibrium; 
-  Do not construct theories in which agents have optimising behaviour; 
-  Do not construct theories with deterministic, closed outcomes. 
The typical features of evolutionary economic growth can be condensed in the positive 
heuristic, which propositions may be as the following: 
-  Construct dynamic, non–deterministic models; 
-  Work with an heterogeneous population of economic agents; 
                                                 
4 Rosenberg (1976, 1982), Freeman (1974), Nelson and Winter (1977), Dosi (1988), Vincenti (1990) and 
others devoted to the analysis of technology suggest the existence of different evolutionary tracks that go 
into distinct directions. The movement along one of those may block movement down another (Nelson 
1995). This line of argumentation highlights concepts as irreversibility and path dependency, which are 
very important in evolutionary theorizing.   
  6
-  Introduce a mechanism that generates novelty in the population, that is mutation 
(generally identified with technical innovations); 
-  Introduce a mechanism that generates selection, associated to the population’s 
economic environment, typically operating on firm’s internal routines. 
At this point it seems pertinent to recall Hoover’s concern about his own investigation 
on a possible new classical research programme: ‘The reader may nonetheless get the 
impression that it is essentially arbitrary. The propositions convey a real sense of the 
nature of the new classical macroeconomics, but it is difficult to say that there are not 
other sets of propositions and injunctions that differ in some points of substance and 
form that would serve equally well as a description of a new classical program’ (Hoover 
1991: 366). This difficulty, following Hoover, emerges because Lakatos’s approach 
implies a very sharp division between what is in the programme and what is not. This 
feature of the Lakatosian framework makes Hoover strongly doubt about the existence 
of research programmes in that sense. 
First, Hoover argues with ‘the problem of individuation’ as ‘How many research 
programs are there in economics?’  (Hoover 1991: 367). As he points, some economists 
consider the existence of a few competing programmes while others regard each sub-
discipline as a research programme. Also, some adopt a broad view, for example 
assuming neoclassical economics as a big programme, while others have a narrow 
perspective regarding it as a set of specialized programmes not in direct competition 
(Hoover 1991). Hoover tries to refute Lakatos’s MSRP not only with the difficulty to 
identify the hard core of a programme irrefutably or to assume the unchangeable nature 
of it, but also with the arguments that the negative heuristic is not unbreakable and that 
usually the positive heuristic is not well-defined as to allow the theoretical task it must 
attain in Lakatos’s framework. 
The definition of evolutionary economic growth as a research programme is vulnerable 
to the critics made by Hoover. A first element that sustains the idea of some 
arbitrariness on the construction of the hard core and the heuristics is the disseminate 
use of the term ‘evolutionary’ in economics as stressed by Hodgson (1999). He 
identifies six principal groups using the term: the Institutionalists in the tradition of 
Veblen and Commons; Schumpeter’s followers; the Austrian School; various writers 
such as Adam Smith, Marx and Marshall; evolutionary game theory; the Santa Fe   
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Institute in the USA. As Hodgson (1998) emphasizes, there is not still consensus on 
what the term ‘evolutionary economics’ should mean and, at the same time, there is an 
increasingly use of it. Therefore, it is important to clarify what is the approach behind 
the employment of the word ‘evolutionary’: ‘nothing is more guaranteed to generate 
confusion and to stultify intellectual progress than to raise a muddled term to the 
centrepiece of economic research, while simultaneously suggesting that a clear and 
well-defined approach to scientific enquiry is implied’ (Hodgson 1998: 161). 
These varieties of evolutionary economics increase the probability of overlapping 
programmes. Hodgson highlights this fact by proposing a classification of approaches to 
‘evolutionary economics’ according to four philosophical criteria - an ontological 
criterion related to novelty; a methodological criterion associated to reductionism; a 
temporal criterion concerned with gradualism; a metaphorical criterion related to the 
presence of biological analogies - which gives 16 possible classifications (Hodgson 
1998). Dosi et al. (2002) emphasize the overlapping between ‘evolutionary’ and some 
‘socio-economic’ analyses of the “fabrics and changes of both technological knowledge 
and economic structures. (…) they all share microfoundations grounded on 
heterogeneous agents, multiple manifestations of ‘bounded rationality’, diverse learning 
patterns and diverse behavioral regularities” (Dosi et. al. 2002: 3). 
Faced with the high probability that distinct approaches may be very close in terms of a 
Lakatosian characterization as ‘hard core and heuristics’, I think it may be useful to 
adopt another framework to capture the main characteristics of scientific process within 
evolutionary technological change and economic growth. Theories of technological 
evolution such as Metcalfe (1988) and theories of economic growth such as Silverberg 
(1988) appear to share the elements of the Lakatosian programme. Therefore, the most 
adequate approach seems to be assuming an enlarged research programme for 
evolutionary technological change and economic growth. However, even assuming this 
broad programme, the narrowness associated to the idea of a fixed hard core means that 
some models widely accepted as evolutionary would be out of the programme. For 
example, as it was identified above, the hard core involves a proposition that accounts 
for the typical presence of decision making procedures (understood as bounded by 
certain elements) on evolutionary economic theorizing. Models as Silverberg et. al. 
(1988) and Metcalfe (1994) do not have explicit decision rules (though the former has 
investment procedures) and nevertheless they are still considered as evolutionary.   
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Also, there are two important lines of research within this field that do not observe 
many of the heuristics defined for the programme: Freeman (1988) is the crucial 
reference on ‘Innovation systems literature’ and Fagerberg (1988) is the benchmark on 
‘Technological gap literature’. Although this literature assumes as indisputable the 
propositions identified above as the hard core of the programme, they use different rules 
to guide their research. Is that sufficient to consider these theories as distinct 
programmes even sharing the same hard core (and here there is room for bias on the 
limitation of the hard core itself)? Hoover (1991) recalls that Lakatos is not coherent on 
this subject as he argues that distinct programmes may have a common hard core, being 
separated only by their positive heuristics (Hoover 1991: 368). However, Hoover 
considers this possibility as one more problem to the project of the Lakatosian 
interpretation of economics since Lakatos supposes that the positive heuristic should be 
not only partially articulated but also established as to press forward the development of 
more complex models. Hoover stresses the highly improbability that positive heuristics 
are partially articulated in the detail demanded by Lakatos as ‘neither the scientist nor 
the commentator can see how models will develop’ (Hoover 1991: 368). So, Hoover 
considers that the positive heuristic usually cannot be well enough defined to be able to 
satisfy the Lakatosian theoretical task. 
Therefore, I will invoke once more Hoover (1991) and his ‘Tribe and Nation’ point of 
view for appraising the evolutionary technological change and economic growth in the 
next section. 
3. GETTING AWAY FROM LAKATOS: HOOVER’S ‘TRIBE AND NATION’ PERSPECTIVE 
Hoover (1991) inspires himself in Kuhn (1970) to propose a distinct method for 
appraising economic theories: his ‘Tribe and Nation’ perspective. He stresses that Kuhn 
identifies the two main meanings associated to the term ‘paradigm’: ‘On the one hand, 
(paradigm) stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on 
shared by the members of a given community. On the other, it denotes one sort of 
element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models 
or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining 
puzzles of normal science’ (Kuhn 1970: 175 quoted from Hoover 1991: 372). The 
second sense, identified by Kuhn as the deeper of the two, at least in philosophical 
terms, is not the one usually associated to the term ‘paradigm’. Hoover is interested in   
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this second sense which Kuhn latter associated to the word ‘exemplar’, adopting a 
picture of scientific practice as specific models serving as concrete exemplars. From 
here Hoover considers that other models may appear only as elaborations or variations 
of the exemplars; others may borrow crucial assumptions or techniques even if distinct 
in purpose; some may import only the ‘spirit’ of the exemplar. Hence, scientific practice 
is conceived as groups of correlated and in some measure overlapping models and 
practices (Hoover 1991). 
An analogy is suggested by Hoover to compare his own perception of science and 
Lakatos’s MSRP: ‘Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programs sees science 
as a collection of nation-states. Each program is defined by its hard core and protective 
belt – a constitution, and police and military. The negative heuristic defines its borders 
with a surveyor’s precision, while the positive heuristic stands guard ready to protect 
the nation from unwanted anomalies or adversarial nation-states. (…) In contrast, the 
view I advocate sees science as a collection of tribes. Models and theories are united by 
ties of kinship and consanguinity’ (Hoover 1991: 375). 
Hoover uses then what he calls an anthropological metaphor to assess scientific 
endeavour as a systematic investigation of the relations of kinship and consanguinity 
among the exemplars of the new classical economics. I will try a similar exercise, using 
Hoover’s metaphor not as a formal methodology but as a language to investigate for 
patterns in evolutionary theories. Figure 1 constitutes a tentative step to such an 
investigation, representing a kind of family tree of evolutionary technological change 
and economic growth. The entries correspond to papers (or books) seen as important in 
the development of that field. The goal is not to make an exhaustive list of the literature 
but as Hoover stresses, to use the papers as exemplars of the most important lines of 
research within the relevant area. The arrows provide some information about the 
direction of influence without reproducing the complete interrelationships between the 
exemplars scheduled. The bottom cells of each column show six families of currently 
lively research within the tribe of evolutionary technological change and economic 
growth: Innovation systems literature; Historian approaches; Sectoral patterns of 
technical change; Technological gap literature; Lock-in models; Evolutionary growth 
models. 





Nelson and  Winter  (1977)
Nelson and 
Winter (1982)
Freeman   (1988) 
Rosenberg   (1982) 
Pavitt   (1984)




















Figure 1 – ‘Kinship and consanguinity’: on evolutionary technological advance 
and economic growth 
 
The seminal work in this tribe is Nelson and Winter’s An Evolutionary Theory of 
Economic Change (1982), with links all over it. The book is a synthesis of Nelson and 
Winter’s previous analyses and offers the reference framework to research through the 
birth of the consanguinity until our days. Andersen et. al. (1996) emphasize that, with 
this book, Nelson and Winter ‘formulated a research programme’ (Andersen et. al. 
1996: 1), also highlighting that ‘the models included in  this book were clearly 
designated to create the outlines of scientific paradigm for evolutionary economics’ 
(Andersen et. al. 1996: 1). Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider that evolutionary 
technological change and economic growth, strongly lying in Nelson and Winter 
(1982), is a research programme in a loose sense and is clearly an exemplar. 
About the foundation of the tribe, the main account appears to be some ‘literary 
fabrications’and not ‘folk tales’
5 (Hoover 1991: 379). As a matter of fact, the elements 
of the tribe believe that their origins lie on an earlier age, looking back to authors like 
Joseph Schumpeter, Armen Alchian and Herbert Simon. Andersen (1997a) helps to 
sustain this idea when he stresses that Nelson and Winter (1982) have used the 
                                                 
5 Hoover (1991: 379) develops a brilliant exercise discussing the existence of foundation myths on the 
basis of every culture and how this idea applies to new classical economics.    
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computer to make a synthesis of earlier contributions, namely Simon’s work on 
behaviour for sustaining a mechanism of transmission; the developments made by 
Schumpeter on the study of invention and innovation to construct a mechanism of 
variety and creation; and Alchian’s work on natural selection to conceive the 
mechanism of selection. 
Nelson and Winter (1982) is the reference guide in research within the tribe offering at 
the same time a new modelling strategy which is closely followed by some researchers 
and an emblematic force for providing some answers, in open terms, to questions such 
as what is expected of the research, how to behave and how to model. Among those 
contributions that closely follow Nelson and Winter some are almost stick to their 
seminal work, presenting extensions to Nelson and Winter’ models (Winter 1984; 
Winter et. al. 2000) while others develop the same type of programmatic approach but 
introducing distinguishing features. For example, Silverberg started in the 1980s a 
distinct stream of analysis identified with contributions such as Silverberg (1984, 1988) 
and Silverberg and Verspagen (1994, 1997a). A particular characteristic of these last 
models is that they conceive technological progress embedded in vintage capital. Dosi is 
responsible for another approach, which is based on ‘bottom-up’ simulations 
(Chiaromonte and Dosi 1993; Dosi et. al. 1994, 1995). The main purpose of this line of 
research is to begin with the basic mechanisms of industrial development without 
making assumptions about the properties of the system and to get the stylized facts of 
development from the co-working of those mechanisms. Kwasnicka and Kwasnicki 
(1992) adopt a similar proceeding. At last, several models may be identified as 
evolutionary and are clearly influenced by the elder elements of the tribe but in a more 
indirect way. Recent contributions that seem to be featured by this type of kinship are, 
for example, Andersen (1997b) and Windrum and Birchenhall (1998). The first offers a 
model based on the scheme of structural economic dynamics brought by Pasinetti 
including an evolutionary microeconomic foundation. The second presents a model with 
two populations (firms and consumers), which are able to learn about the preferences of 
each other and to adapt. This adaptive learning is reconciled by technological designs 
traded on the market. The selection mechanism is based on this adaptive learning 
capacity of both populations. Still within the ‘spirit’ of the exemplar (as Nelson and 
Winter, 1982), Eliasson (1989) develops a simulation model with micro foundation of 
national economy, calibrated to explain the evolution of the Swedish economy.   
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Also, once more picking on Hoover, a diachronic analysis can highlight the common 
origins of the current lines of research within the tribe above identified, all of them 
beginning with Freeman’s, Rosenberg’s and Nelson and Winter’s earlier works. 
On the other hand, a synchronic analysis can identify competition between some 
families such as Technological gap literature and Evolutionary growth models. The first 
family, strongly drawing on Fagerberg (1988), follows a more appreciative theorizing 
approach
6 while the second lies on formal modelling procedures usually (but not 
necessarily) helped by simulation languages. Both families fall inside the tribe and both 
try to answer the question of what can explain economic growth, highlighting the role of 
technological change. The former emerged as a need to overcome the failure of formal 
growth theories to recognize the role of innovation and diffusion of technology on 
economic growth. On one of the topics in recent growth theory’s agenda – the 
convergence of productivity levels – these ‘technology gap’ theories consider that 
convergence is provoked by the international diffusion of technological knowledge. 
Typically the theoretical contributions on this family are appreciative, being very close 
to empirical work. Also, this literature considers not useful the distinction between 
‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ factors for explaining economic growth. It is 
emphasized the idea of ‘social system’ composed by distinct ‘domains’ such as the 
techno-economic domain and the institutional domain, being crucial the influence 
between them (Verspagen, 2000)
7. The later, closely following the initial work of 
Nelson and Winter, is based on a formal, programmatic approach. As Andersen (1997a) 
puts it, Nelson and Winter’s synthesis gave rise to a new modelling strategy: ‘(1) Define 
the minimum environmental characteristics, including input and output conditions as 
well as the spaces in which search for new rules are performed. (2) Define the state of 
the industry at time t as a list of firm states, which include physical and informational 
characteristics as well as behavioural rules and meta-rules. (3) Calculate by means of (1) 
and (2) the activities of the industry in period t as well as the resultant state variables 
(including possible changes of rules) which characterize the system at the start of period 
t+1. (4) Make similar calculations for a series of periods and study the evolution of the 
                                                 
6 Nelson and Winter (1982) suggest two levels of theorizing: formal theory and appreciative theory. The 
former is conceived as logical and mathematical and the latter is considered as being closer to empirical 
work, offering guidance and interpretation to it.   
7 Innovation Systems Literature is also a less formal theorizing, focusing on evolution driven by firms and 
institutions as a process of qualitative change with a historical context.   
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application of different rules as well as other characteristics of the industry (economy)’ 
(Andersen 1997a: 7). 
Having started with Lakatos’s MSRP and trying to go beyond that by following 
Hoover’s ‘Tribe and Nation’ perspective conducted to a more comprehensive picture of 
what is evolutionary technological change and economic growth. It may be seen as a 
research programme, although in a more loose sense than in the Lakatosian original 
interpretation, materialized on the tribe of interrelated models of economic growth and 
dynamics, with most families adopting wider scientific processes than the strict tracking 
of the programmatic approach designed by Nelson and Winter. The table of kinship and 
consanguinity (figure 1) tries to account for that. 
The next section intends to bring in, although in preliminary terms, the discussion 
around the rivalry between the tribes that may have been fighting for the economic 
growth territory. Returning to Hoover’s picture there seems to exist a tribe that 
dominates the territory and some others (tolerated by the dominant one? Unquestionably 
enemies?) that occupy a few lands  and struggle for their philosophies of science. This 
dominant tribe, which has been assimilating many of the physical and mental elements 
of others located in attractive and fertile sights, is the neoclassical endogenous growth 
theory. One of the smallest (rebellious? already dominated?) is evolutionary economic 
growth and technological change. 
4.  NEOCLASSICAL  ENDOGENOUS  GROWTH  THEORY AS THE  RIVAL  (DOMINANT) 
TRIBE 
Most economists consider a pleonastic verbalization talking about economic growth 
theory and neoclassical growth theory. When an economist thinks about growth theory 
usually he has in mind the question: ‘what is the balanced, steady-state, long-run 
equilibrium growth path of an economy, balanced in the sense that all the critical 
variables in the growth model – output, capital, labour, saving and investment – change 
at a constant exponential rate into the indefinite future?’ This is the case though 
economies observe more or less continuous structural changes in their sectoral and 
industrial composition of output, not growing in balanced steady states even for short 
periods of time (Blaug 2000b: 1). 
It is widely known that the theory of economic growth has been dominated by the work 
of Solow in the 1950s and the subsequent modifications of his neoclassical general   
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equilibrium steady state model.  One stream of development within this framework has 
been the new growth theories that began with Romer and Lucas in the 1980s usually 
labeled as endogenous growth theory in contrast with exogenous growth theory in 
Solow’s tradition. This description is associated to the fact that seemingly growth is 
explained in the theory as a product of growth itself, namely as the result of the profit-
driven activity of private firms
8, while in the old growth theory technical progress is not 
itself explained (Blaug 2000b). 
The new neoclassical growth models capture several of the understandings about 
technical advance well recognized by empirical studies developed since the 1950s 
(Nelson, 1998)
9. However, the emergence of these new endogenous growth models took 
place long after the recognizing of technical advance as the key driving force of 
economic growth. Why this lag of more than a quarter of century? 
Nelson (1998) argues that what he calls appreciative theory which interpreted and 
oriented empirical research on technological change since the fifties ‘had a life of it’s 
own, and that, if the researchers did not call attention to discrepancies they found with 
formal growth theory, no one else was particularly bothered by them. In some cases this 
required a certain obeisance on the part of the empirical researchers. But the 
appreciative theory did not presume any tight equilibrium, or perfect competition. If the 
empirical researchers made no fuss, what the formal theory said had only a minor 
influence on the empirical research and appreciative theorizing, and vice versa’ (Nelson 
1998: 505). Nevertheless, after some years, the neoclassical growth theory rehabilitated. 
                                                 
8 Blaug (2000a) sums up the three paths developed to deal with the introduction of profit-motivated 
technical progress in the standard neoclassical growth model of perfect competition and constant returns 
to scale. One is based on Arrow’s  (1962) notion of ‘learning-by-doing’ which allows for endogenous 
growth even if homogeneous aggregate production functions are assumed. The other two employ the 
concept of externalities being first associated to Romer and Lucas: individual agents (firms, labourers) 
invest in some form of technological change (knowledge generated by embodied investment in R&D in 
Romer (1986) and by investment on actions as job-training and on more formally educated workers in 
Lucas (1988)) and the external effects of those investments are added to the inputs of all other firms. 
Therefore, it is possible to generate endogenous economic growth assuming constant returns to scale to 
any cumulative factor of production (physical or human capital) in a (perfectly) competitive economy by 
considering external effects to other firms, industries and countries. A weakness of the models such as 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) is the omission of a clear microeconomic foundation for the production 
of knowledge itself, that is, for explaining the way externalities and the decision to invest in technological 
change take place (Verspagen, 1993). A few years latter, papers like Romer (1990), Grossman and 
Helpman (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) tried to overcome this limitation and technological 
change became explained from the perspective of the market structure and price relations. It is now 
assumed that part of the effects of innovation can be appropriate by some degree of monopoly power and 
the other part corresponds to external effects. For a detailed review on neoclassical endogenous growth 
models see Verspagen (1993) or Aghion and Howitt (1998). 
9 Freeman (1982) offers a fine survey of such understandings.   
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As Blaug (2000b) recalls, many scholars like Solow (1991) consider that the evidence 
behind the efforts of Romer and Lucas to create the endogenous growth models was the 
widely recognition in the 1980s that there had been divergence rather than convergence 
between countries, at least at a global level, while the old growth theory (à la Solow) 
suggested the so-called ‘convergence hypothesis’. Though, Romer (1994: 11 quoted 
from Blaug 2000b:  8) disdained at this idea about the origins of the framework: ‘My 
original work in growth was motivated primarily by the observation that in the broad 
sweep of history, classical economists like Malthus and Ricardo came to the 
conclusions that were completely wrong about prospects for growth. Over time, growth 
rates have been increasing, not decreasing’. 
Clearly emerging in the 1980s inside the neoclassical economics, the endogenous 
growth models searched for inspiration in an earlier past. Blaug points to Allyn Young, 
Laughlin Currie and Nicholas Kaldor as progenitors of these models. In the early 1920s 
they advocated already ‘the cumulative, self-propelling approach to growth theory’ 
(Blaug 2000b: 9). Also, the ideas that technical advance usually is the outcome of 
previous investments in R&D or that education reflects itself in human capital were 
present in economics long before their incorporation in formal models. Nelson (1998) 
puts great emphasizes on Abramovitz (1952) who, writing a few years before the 
publication of the Solow model, highlighted the absence at that time of a coherent 
modern growth theory able to guide research at the empirical level. He understood that 
economic growth was, on one level, the result of changes in the ‘immediate 
determinants of output’ (land, labour, capital), arguing that this level of analysis was not 
sufficient and that a reasonable growth theory should try to deal with the forces behind 
the immediate determinants. One of Abramovitz’s strong statements was that technical 
advance explained a very large share of the growth of output, a conviction that would be 
coherent with latter exercises of growth accounting such as Schmookler (1952), 
Kendrick (1956) and Abramovitz (1956). For Abramovitz, technical advance emerged 
largely from investments implemented to promote it, so he already conceived technical 
advance as endogenous, also recognizing that the investments responsible for new 
proprietary technology engender as well externalities at least associated to the gain of 
experience and the widespread of the new ability (Nelson 1998). A final point to 
highlight the earlier Abramovitz’s contributions to economic growth is the way he 
conceived the relations between technical advance and the growth of other factors: a   
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clear interdependence which was itself a source of economic growth.  At this level he 
stressed the role of enterprises and institutions, identifying modern corporations as 
crucial actors in technical progress and in the investment at the equipment level. Also, 
he stated the importance of the broader cultural and institutional factors that constituted 
the context where the enterprise was inserted, recognizing the importance of political, 
psychological and sociological forces for understanding economic growth (Nelson 
1998). 
The focus on Abramovitz and his contributions to economic growth meant to create a 
background to understand some of the limitations pointed to new neoclassical growth 
models. Following Nelson (1998) a first critique is that, although these formal models 
seem more close to economic ‘reality’ in the sense that they capture at least some of the 
characteristics of growth strongly enhanced by technical advance, the phenomena they 
incorporate in analysis ‘scarcely represent new insights or ideas’ (Nelson 1998: 498). 
Even faced with the counter-attack by the propellers of these new models based on the 
conviction that a causal argument is well treated only when it is formally articulated, 
Nelson still considers relevant to ask what are the gains obtained by the ‘formalisation 
of existing unformalised understandings’ (Nelson 1998: 498). 
On this point, I think it is essential to recall the importance of formalisation to the 
emergence and consolidation of modern economic growth as the subsequent work to the 
Solow model shows. Even being aware, as Nelson stresses, that the work of Solow in 
the 1950s did not fill an ‘intellectual vacuum’, it remains unquestionable its main role in 
the origins of growth theory (Blaug 2000b) and this relevance, as Nelson himself 
recognizes, is associated to the fact that Solow’s analysis “was structured by a ‘formal’ 
theory, whereas the theorizing in these earlier pieces was more ‘appreciative and looser’ 
(Nelson 1998: 504). Similarly, the formalisation of already existent ideas by the new 
neoclassical growth models was crucial to the renewed interest in economic growth 
observed since the mid 1980s. 
Therefore, one important part of the agenda for new growth theories seems to 
correspond to the formalisation of understandings about technical change and economic 
growth (Nelson 1998). Being so, it may be ‘useful to ask why certain ideas have been 
picked up and formalized and others not’ (Nelson 1998: 499). According to Nelson the 
answer to this question could be the relevance of the understanding as it was the case for 
the inappropriateness of the assumption of perfect competition when confronted with   
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the features of endogenous technical change. That criterion would mean, in Nelson’s 
perception, that because uncertainty in a Knightian sense is also very important for 
modelling technical advance and economic growth, the new models should also pursue 
the task of formalizing this concept; that did not occur
10. Also, they do not seem 
attracted to explore the evidence that firms have different capacities and strategies or 
that national economic institutions, for example the university research system, are 
crucial determinants of economic growth. For Nelson these ignored issues are the proof 
that another important part of the agenda of the new growth theory is ‘to hold the 
modelling as close as possible to the canons of general equilibrium theory’ and that, as a 
result of these choices, the new neoclassical contributions are still operating at the first 
level for understanding economic growth, the level of the ‘immediate determinants’ 
(Nelson 1998: 499). 
On this topic Blaug (2000b: 12) states that the modelling is “ingenious but it simply 
reeks with ad hoc assumptions that sound plausible and may even be true but we are 
given no hints of how to discover whether they are in fact true’. This statement is, at a 
certain extent, recognized by economists operating inside the mainstream on the topic of 
economic growth. Solow (1991) himself makes the so-called internal critique to the 
neoclassical growth theory clearly affirming that most of the special assumptions made 
on these new models (about technology, the nature of research activity or the formation 
of human capital, among many others) ‘have been chosen for convenience, because they 
make a difficult analytical problem more transparent. There is no reason to assume that 
they are descriptively valid, or that their implications have significant robustness against 
equally plausible variations in assumptions’ (Solow 1991: 412). Also, Aghion and 
Howitt (1998: 65) consider as ‘quite severe and having nothing to recommend them 
except tractability’ some of the assumptions made to ensure the existence of a steady 
state with balanced growth. This situation is present not only in the Solow-Swan model 
with technical change but also in models where technology is endogeneized
11. These 
                                                 
10 Even when these new models allow for uncertainty about the future, they treat it as a well-known 
probability of possible future events. For example, Aghion and Howitt (1992) present a model where the 
research sector is modelled considering that technological advances are stochastic. They use a Poisson 
distribution to represent the probability of success of the research efforts meaning that the arrival rate of 
research success in a given period relies on the intensity of such efforts and on the parameters of the 
distribution. Although they introduce a stochastic approach to innovation able to capture the perspective 
of innovation as a search process with an uncertain result, the decision problem to decide on R&D 
spending level is represented as a patent race with a known probability of draw an innovation as a 
function of R&D effort (Silverberg and Verspagen 1997b). 
11 For more detail on this topic see Aghion and Howitt (1998).   
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rigid assumptions eliminate important phenomena from the analysis and the answer to 
important questions is made only by allegation (Aghion and Howitt 1998). One of the 
limitations stated by Aghion and Howitt is the lack of attention given to institutions and 
transaction costs by the neoclassical endogenous growth literature. They also consider 
that the discard of the representative agent assumption would allow the models to 
“incorporate the political dimension of ‘creative destruction’” (Aghion and Howitt 
1998: 67). The comments of this nature made by researchers located inside the 
mainstream seem to subtract relevance to Nelson’s perspective about the agenda for this 
line of research as it appears that at least some economists (seen as neoclassical) are 
very well aware of the existence of limitations within their research rules and are open 
to deal with them, benefiting from the insights given by other theoretical approaches or 
by the empirical work. Nevertheless, the options that have been made by neoclassical 
(optimal) formal modelling since World War II may give some support to Nelson’s 
view: the choice of the understandings introduced in formal models is very much 
connected with ‘the culture in economics as with the particular power of formal 
modeling’ and the formalisation of more understandings about technical advance and 
economic growth will be difficult while formal growth theorizing kept constrained to 
the principles of equilibrium theorizing. 
After drawing on some ideas with the purpose of understanding the origins and the 
present characteristics of the dominant tribe, the new neoclassical growth models, let’s 
return to evolutionary theorizing and to the context where its main contributions on the 
topic of technological advance and economic growth emerged. 
The empirical research on growth during the 1950s and 1960s strongly contributed to 
the recognition of some general features of technological advance: first, important 
uncertainties were present in the research developed to attain advantage over the current 
technology, being highly different the associated risks to distinct agents; second, as a 
result of divergent opinions and insights among experts in a certain field, different 
entities or organizations promote distinct efforts at each moment, being in competition 
with each other and with the current technology; third, it is only after the commitment 
of important resources by the rivals that occurs the definition of the winners and the 
losers as the outcome of competition. ‘These features, together, naturally suggested 
evolutionary language and led to the development of explicit evolutionary theories of 
technological advance’ (Nelson and Winter 2002: 38). As figure 1 presented in section 3   
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meant to show, there is a general body of understanding around the idea that 
technological advance is an evolving phenomenon, which has been growing since 
Freeman’s, Rosenberg’s and Nelson and Winter’s earlier contributions and is nowadays 
present in distinct research families. Within this tribe it is important to highlight three 
main common features (Nelson and Winter 2002: 39): first, the recognition of the 
motion of technology and industry structure as a ‘co-evolution’; second, ‘technology 
must be understood as involving a body of artifacts, or practice, and a body of 
understanding. (…) more generally, artifacts, practice and understanding co-evolve’; 
third, there has been increasing recognition of the range of institutions involved in 
technological advance. 
The ‘evolutionary technological advance and economic growth’ tribe does not believe 
on the research programme adopted within the mainstream. The tribe sees the 
emergence of the new neoclassical growth models as a corroboration of the failure of 
the neoclassical rules of research, considering that “these ‘new’ neoclassical models are 
‘mechanical’ in the same sense as are the old ones. They do not address the problems 
with neoclassical growth theory felt by the authors of evolutionary alternatives” (Nelson 
1995: 68). In these ‘new’ approaches the conceptual tools are essentially static, for 
example optimal rationality, production functions and equilibrium systems based on 
Newtonian mechanical analogies, and it is offered a weakly explanation of the process 
of technical change (Northover 1999). Therefore, the tribe keeps the faith in its 
scientific endeavour and continues the hostilities against the mainstream even if its 
domains are narrow, being constrained to some centers of research, specially in Europe, 
for example, the DRUID, Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics, in Denmark; 
the MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology, in 
the Netherlands and the LEM, Laboratory of Economics and Management, in Italy, and 
to their own specific journals as the Journal of Evolutionary Economics, the Research 
Policy and the Industrial and Corporate Change. 
Since both tribes were launched mostly in the 1980s and the neoclassical one had a 
much stronger impact in the economic science, we may conjecture that the other has 
already lost the war. However, it must be reminded that endogenous growth models 
were developed inside the mainstream and that fact sustains for itself an easier 
acceptance by the economists. Indeed, it is straightforward the conclusion that graduate 
training in economics emphasizes the neoclassical framework (Nelson 1998). Also, it is   
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much easier to get into the more general and broadly read economic journals formal 
models, particularly those developed in the optimal and axiomatic neoclassical 
reasoning. 
As well, we may wonder why did not the evolutionary approach visibly take off on a 
time characterized by the development of molecular biology. Perhaps we could picture a 
delay on the influence of these most recent developments inside biology to reach the 
economic sphere, for example in the importation of modelling tools. But most 
imperative to conceive the development and spread of the tribe seems to be the digital 
computer, although the influence of the computer in developments within economics is 
very young. Mirowski (2002: 4-5) highlights the rise of the cyborg sciences, which 
occurred mainly in the USA during the World War II, and its profound effects for the 
content and organization of natural and social sciences. He stresses the pressure exerted 
by the current scientific diaspora, caused by the disturbing impact that the end of the 
Cold War and the associated changes in the funding of scientific research had on 
physics (‘the ubiquitous contraction of physics and the continuing expansion of 
molecular biology’ (Mirowski 2002: 10)), for the beginning of the transformation of 
economic concepts. ‘Increasingly, physicists left to their own devices have found that 
economics … has proved a relatively accommodating safe heaven in their time of 
troubles’ (Mirowski 2002: 10). As a result of such interdisciplinary research, a different 
method of economics has emerged, based on a combination between computational 
languages and institutional themes. This birth resulted from ‘the progressive realization 
that cyborgs and neoclassicals could not be so readily yoked one to another’, 
converging to ‘numerous tensions in fin-de-siècle orthodox economics’ (Mirowski 
2002: 11). 
Mirowski’s perspective may help to sustain a scenario featured by the strengthening of 
evolutionary economics, precisely because the development of computational methods 
has increasingly allowed for dealing with the complexity associated to its open-system 
approach. In the next section some final remarks are drawn. 
5. FINAL REMARKS 
This essay was motivated by a need for enlightenment on what is evolutionary 
technological change and economic growth. The main goal was not to construct a 
survey but to develop a tentative step towards greater clarification or even towards   
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appraisal of those understandings using as starting point Lakatos’s MSRP. This was 
carried on even if I was (at a certain extent, at least) aware of the problems associated to 
such procedure such as ‘how far the methodology chosen is appropriate for economics’ 
or ‘should the methodology explain everything. Would some other methodology, such 
as Kuhn’s paradigms, have performed equally well?’ (Backhouse 1998: 3-4). 
As it was stated at the end of section 3, this task evolved to a point whereas my 
reasoning was willing to accept the existence of a research programme on the topic in 
appraisal but only in a more loose sense than the one offered by Lakatos’s original 
frame. A more complete picture (though perhaps more descriptive and with many 
ambiguous elements) of the scientific endeavours that constitute evolutionary 
technological change and economic growth seemed to be achieved with the ‘Tribe and 
Nation’ perspective borrowed from Hoover (1991). 
After that, the essay intended to introduce some discussion around the competition 
between the tribe until then in study and the neoclassical endogenous growth theory, 
widely interpreted as the mainstream – the dominant tribe. Therefore, on section 4 some 
considerations were made with three goals in mind: to better understand the origins of 
both theories, to submit to discussion the problems (widely ignored or neglected by 
most economists) that characterize what can be also assumed as the ‘rival research 
programme’ and the way evolutionists have been evolving in this environment. 
An appraisal of any of these theoretical approaches – the evolutionary and the new 
neoclassical – based on the Lakatosian framework would be upsetting. Lakatos argued 
that a research programme should be appraised according to the way it evolved over 
time (Backhouse 1998). In the Lakatosian sense a programme is theoretically 
progressive if predicts novel facts. Since these predictions can be tested they offer a link 
between theoretical and empirical progress (Backhouse 1997: 103) and so the 
programme is empirically progressive if the new facts are corroborated. If we 
understand ‘novel facts’ as facts of which no one was aware when the predictions were 
made or facts not used in making the prediction surely the new neoclassical and the 
evolutionary growth theories should be appraised as degenerating programmes. 
Blaug (2000b) develops a discussion comparing the old neoclassical growth theory and 
the new one that sustains a pessimistic appraisal result for the mainstream approach. He 
states that it is impossible to choose between these theories, at least as a choice based on   
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arguments of realism or descriptive precision. ‘It also turns out (…) that the two 
theories are observationally equivalent and even their growth-oriented policy 
implications are virtually identical. Clearly, if we must choose between them, we will 
have to base our choice on modelling grounds: the simplicity, elegance and tractability 
of one model over another’ (Blaug 2000b: 4). Blaug also affirms that the new 
neoclassical growth theory has the same defects as the old one. ‘A theory of an 
economy in constant exponential growth, not just in the aggregate but in all its essential 
components, can only be a mathematical toy, incapable in its very construction of 
bearing any resemblance to an actual economy’ (Blaug 2000b: 13). Based on this 
judgment Blaug considers that the excitement about the new growth theories took place 
because they seem ‘to explain what was previously left in the dark but, more 
importantly, it features a brand of theorizing that is at times analytically elegant and at 
all times analytically demanding. Indeed, much of the literature of the new growth 
theory is so exclusively preoccupied with the modeling requirements of neoclassical 
theorizing – (…) – that there is little space left for the consideration of empirical 
evidence’ (Blaug 2000b: 12). Hence, on this point Blaug and Nelson (1998) seem to 
agree. 
For the other tribe the conclusions in terms of appraisal are not less disappointing. As 
Andersen (1997a) stresses there are fundamental intrinsic difficulties within the 
evolutionary field: the outcome of evolutionary processes has very little predictability, 
which may block the falsification of evolutionary theorizing and the idea of eclecticism 
associated to the ‘synthetic character of the evolutionary mechanism which forces 
evolutionary-economic theories to transgress the borders of different social-sciences 
disciplines’ (Andersen 1997a: 2). On this point it may be useful to recall that the 
prediction power of this theory arises from the specification it does of systematic 
selection forces present on the dynamic processes (Nelson 1995). Typically 
evolutionary growth models rely upon stochastic technological change as the driving 
force of economic growth. The outcome of this stochastic path usually consists, after 
taking place a selection process, in the possibility of a wide range of economic patterns, 
with several of them seeming compatible with the stylized facts on economic growth 
(Silverberg and Verspagen 1997b). However, it is recognized the need for more 
accuracy on the feasible range of results predicted by these models and for more 
clarification of the general features of the patterns generated by the simulation   
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procedures. The accomplishment of these needs demands more work on methodological 
issues such as the standing of simulation trials relative to analytical outcomes and also 
on the statistical evaluation of the outcomes created by computer simulations 
(Silverberg and Verspagen 1997b). If such efforts start to be seen as fundamental by 
evolutionists conducting to a greater ability to predict with accuracy, maybe will see 
some ‘empirical progress’ in economics, and if the language used by them becomes 
more clear maybe some ‘theoretical progress’ will be achieved (Blaug, 2000a). In such 
possible development it gains relevance the discussion by Mirowski and Somefun 
(1998: 1) around the convergence to ‘an Automata approach of Institutional (and 
Evolutionary) Economics’ and their expectation that the computational approach ‘can 
foster a viable and rich institutional economics that encourages both mathematical rigor 
and historical relevance while avoiding the mechanical aspects of conventional 
neoclassical theory’. 
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